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China pe rspect i ves
Since the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis that has particularly af-fected those countries situated on the periphery of the eurozone,China has repeatedly declared itself willing to buy European govern-
ment bonds. During their official visit to Europe in autumn 2010, Chinese
President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao both expressed China’s
concern over the situation in Greece and promised, in the name of the Chi-
nese Government, to buy part of that country’s public debt, without men-
tioning a precise sum. During a visit to Spain in January 2011, Li Keqiang,
a member of the standing committee of the CCP Politburo and Deputy
Prime Minister, confirmed China’s intention of continuing to buy European
sovereign debt. Against the background of the worsening Greek crisis, the
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the PRC’s support for Europe,
stating that China had been continually accumulating stock in euro since
the financial crisis of 2008. According to certain Western sources, including
Standard Chartered, the total amount of Chinese purchases of euro zone
government bonds is estimated at 650 billion euros, a figure that has never
been officially confirmed by the Chinese authorities.
European feeling over the Chinese purchase of Greek, Portuguese, and
Spanish debt remains ambivalent: on the one hand, the Europeans hope to
take advantage of the Chinese market and capital to redress the economy
of the Old Continent, but on the other, they remain anxious and sceptical
as to what Chinese political ambitions this apparent generosity might be
hiding. For some observers, it is the very sovereignty of Europe that is
threatened. Faced with this suspicion and distrust, the Chinese authorities,
as well as very many economists, would like to present the image of a
China that is increasingly responsible and involved in the international fi-
nancial situation, a stance that seems more in tune with its new economic
and financial importance. According to Ding Chun, (1) Zhao Boying, (2) Yin
Jianfeng, (3) and Shen Jianguang (4) in particular, it is in the mutual interests
of China and the EU to work together on redressing the economy of Euro-
pean countries in difficulty. The European sovereign debt crisis could have
considerable repercussions for the Chinese economy, in particular as re-
gards the following four points:
• in the first instance, new monetary policies of quantitative easing (量化
寬鬆貨幣政策 – lianghua kuansong huobi zhengce ) engendered by the
crisis risk introducing inflation into China through imports;
• next, a worsening of the economic climate in Europe – the primary des-
tination of Chinese exports since 2005 – would constitute a blow to Chi-
nese exports;
• thirdly, the crisis is likely to trigger a currency war, increasing pressure on
the appreciation of the yuan;
• and finally, the risk of devaluation of the euro would not be good news
for the safeguarding of Chinese foreign exchange reserves, all the more
so since the percentage of Chinese assets in euros has been steadily in-
creasing in recent years.
The majority of Chinese economists believe that China’s purchase of Eu-
ropean debt enables it above all to protect its economic interests. Many of
these economists emphasise that the risk and cost of this involvement are
largely inferior to the risk and cost of inaction. Firstly, in terms of Sino-Eu-
ropean trade, Ding Chun explains that it is in China’s interest to support
the European economy in order to maintain Europe’s purchasing power,
and consequently, imports of Chinese products. This is vital for the Chinese
economy, which still depends heavily on foreign trade. Zhao Boying is of
the same opinion as Ding and at the same time recommends greater ef-
forts on the part of China to adjust the imbalance of trade and favour im-
ports from the EU. He also believes this contributes to the continued im-
portation of innovative products and cutting-edge technologies as well as
of the advanced managerial practices China still lacks. Moreover, this offer
of Chinese capital could facilitate investments by Chinese companies in
Europe by bypassing certain protectionist obstacles that they may en-
counter when exporting (notably non-tariff measures such as anti-dump-
ing and anti-subsidy regulations and technical norms).
In an interview given to Huaxia shibao at the beginning of the year on
the subject of the purchase by China of 6 billion euros’ worth of Spanish
government bonds, the economist Yin Jianfeng decodes Chinese financial
interests. He reminds us that, according to IMF statistics, the international
monetary system is dominated by the dollar, which represents a little less
than 70 percent of world reserves, whilst the euro constitutes less than 30
percent. Up until the end of March 2011, the balance of China’s foreign ex-
change reserves totalled $3,040 billion, (5) of which the majority (around
70 percent, according to certain estimates) was in dollars. The announce-
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1. Director of the European Studies Centre of Fudan University, Secretary General of the Chinese Society
of Studies on the European Union (CSEUS, Chinese Society for EU Studies).
2. Director of the Department of Literature and History at the Chinese Central Party School.
3. Deputy Director of the Financial Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
4. General Director and Chief Economist of Mizuho Securities Asia, and senior ex-economist of the Bank
of China.
5. Source: the Department of State for foreign currencies.
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ment of “QE2” (Quantitative Easing 2) by the American Federal Reserve on
3 November 2010, which led to a competitive devaluation of the dollar,
dealt a severe blow to Chinese assets. By directing part of Chinese invest-
ments towards European stock, therefore, China benefits not only from
more diverse portfolios that limit the risk of losses in case of devaluation,
but also from a reduction of its dependence on American Treasury bills
with lower rates of return.
Support from China also reinforces the confidence of the international
market, maintaining the position of the euro and limiting the risk for China
of a monetisation of debt policy. This amounts to attenuating inflationist
pressures within China and, according to Zhao Boying, to partially attenu-
ating constant pressure from the United States to revalue the yuan. How-
ever, the majority of Chinese experts believe that Beijing’s real intention is
to counterbalance the predominance of the dollar in order to arrive at a
multipolar or tripartite world monetary system made up of the dollar, the
euro, and the yuan (三足鼎立的國際貨幣體系 – sanzu dingli de guojì huobi
tixi ). Nonetheless, the current sovereign debt crisis, if mishandled, runs a
strong risk of threatening the very existence of the euro. The result of this
is that so long as the yuan remains inconvertible in the short and medium-
term, the most direct means for Beijing to arrive at this tripartite system
is to continue to support the euro.
China’s commitment to Europe also has a political and diplomatic dimen-
sion. Ding Chun points out that the sovereign crisis in the eurozone occurs
against a background of Sino-European reconciliation after a period of diplo-
matic freeze, and of a return to the pragmatism of the EU since the entry
into force of the treaty of Lisbon. By supporting Greece, Portugal, and Spain,
Beijing is in effect making a gesture of solidarity towards the leading econ-
omy in the eurozone, Germany, and is showing itself to be more conscious
of its image and international influence. Following China, Japan also intends
to buy stock issued by the European Financial Stability Facility. Zhao Boying
reveals the underlying stake in a Chinese strategy that consists of building a
Sino-European partnership and rebalancing the strategic China-Europe-
United States triangle to create a multipolar international order. Although
the Chinese authorities have never explicitly said so, for many analysts such
as Ding Chun and Zhao Boying, China could be led to exploit its position as
a creditor to exercise pressure on the EU over certain sensitive subjects such
as the recognition of China’s market economy status, the lifting of the arms
embargo on China, the relaxing of restrictions on the export of high technol-
ogy products to China, and opposition to China’s commercial protectionism
of its products and investments. Moreover, Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Li
Keqiang explicitly pleaded for greater effort on the part of Europeans in
meetings with Zapatero, Wulff, and Cameron last January.
Many economists underline the opportunities that the crisis can also
bring China, in particular, a step towards internationalisation of the yuan
and the restructuring of its economic sector. Shen Jianguang (6) holds the
opinion that in the long term, the most positive response to the European
debt crisis would be to accelerate the agenda for the internationalisation
of the yuan. Due to the inconvertibility of Chinese currency and the con-
trol of the flow of capital, the yuan still cannot become a world reserve
currency. Despite the many problems of the American and European
economies, at present China can only continue to hold assets in dollars and
euros and accumulate massive foreign exchange reserves. The internation-
alisation of the yuan could diminish the losses caused by depreciation of
the dollar and the euro. Other economists such as Yin Zhongqing (7) recom-
mend greater diversity in Chinese investments by progressively increasing
the percentage of raw material reserves, in particular precious metals, oil,
and other energy resources.
Yin Zhongli (8) is also fairly optimistic as to the potential opportunity the
sovereign debt crisis represents for the Chinese economy, and in particular
puts forward two short-term measures. As regards foreign policy, he ad-
vises Beijing to participate moderately but positively in solving the Euro-
pean sovereign crisis in order to strengthen the “affective” link with Europe,
where the alter-globalist movement is likely to intensify with the worsen-
ing of the Greek debts crisis, leading to a rise in protectionism. As for the
domestic situation, he suggests that as a countermeasure to QE2 by the
United States and possibly the eurozone, China should implement a re-
strictive monetary policy and in particular maintain pressure on the sud-
den rise in the price of assets. In the first instance, this will doubtless lead
to the appreciation of the yuan, a fall in exports, corporate bankruptcy and
a rise in unemployment. Nonetheless, Yin Zhongli insists that China could
seize this opportunity to promote economic modernisation and industrial
restructuring towards sectors with greater added value so as to prepare for
the challenges of reindustrialisation in developed countries.
Not everybody sees life through rose-coloured spectacles, however. A few
discordant notes have also been sounded contesting the measures envisaged
by Beijing, among them remarks by He Zhicheng, senior economist at the
Agricultural Bank of China. He Zhicheng believes that the sovereign debt crisis
in the eurozone may prove to be a trap to short China (歐債危機實際是做空中
國的一條暗線 – ouzhai weiji shiji shi zuokong zhongguo de yitiao anxian ). The
losses on the Chinese stock exchange, in free-fall since mid-April, are concomi-
tant not only with the positions taken by the financial giants who speculate
on China’s crash, but also with the sovereign crisis that is spreading throughout
peripheral European countries. According to He, China holds at least 600 billion
euros’ worth of European debt, including 100 billion euros of government
bonds issued by PIIGS. If the sovereign debt crisis really does erupt (triggered
perhaps by payment default by Greece), China will then suffer a colossal loss,
very probably accompanied by an explosion of tension – economic, social and
political – on the domestic front. He seems convinced that the least costly so-
lution to resolve the Greek crisis would be to expel Greece from the eurozone.
He believes that the current situation, in which the European leaders are des-
perately attempting to delay the inevitable, will increase the possibility of a
crash landing for the Chinese economy.
He also observes that when certain major financial institutions in Europe
began to reduce their purchases of Greek stocks (up to around 40 percent,
according to his sources), Beijing continued to lend money to Athens. For
He, only two measures can save the Chinese economy: either a drastic re-
duction in purchases of European sovereign debt, or an adjustment of the
composition of the stock by buying more German bonds or shares in finan-
cially solid companies. Another economist, Yu Yongding, (9) also calls for
caution and exhorts the People’s Bank of China to buy more AAA-rated
stock issued by the European Financial Stability Facility.
z Translated by Elizabeth Guill
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